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The literature postulates that government subsidization of strategic R&D activities of profit 
maximising firms (PMFs) increases their shares in international markets. Will this also hold 
for labor-managed firms (LMFs) which are owned by employees and aim to maximize the 
profit per labor? This paper provides a theoretical model that examines how such governmental 
interventions can help LMFs in their home countries to compete better with PMFs in 
international markets. Our model shows that in most, but not all cases, investing more in R&D 
activities benefits LMFs by increasing their shares in international markets and decreasing the 
market share of their competitors. The optimal government R&D subsidy or tax for LMFs 
depends on the R&D elasticity of LMFs as well as how their competitors react to  R&D 
investment. In contrast, the optimal government R&D subsidy for PMFs depends solely on the 
slope of the R&D reaction curve of PMFs competitors. Our results present useful policy 
implications for those governments that seek ways to support LMFs - or more broadly 
cooperatives - to attain more sustained growth given their advantages over PMFs in the context 
of sustainable development.  
JEL classification: A1; F1 
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1. Introduction 
One common policy instrument used by governments in many countries is the granting of 
subsidies, especially subsidies on research and development (R&D) activities, to assist 
exporting companies gain market power in international markets. One reason for this strategy 
is that while export subsidization is impermissible, R&D subsidization is a more appealing 
policy tool for a government because it faces less WTO reinforcement.    
A firm’s investment in R&D activities plays a critical role in enhancing its competitive 
power in the global market. In an imperfectly competitive market in which both profit-
maximizing firms (henceforth PMFs, or PM firms) use R&D investments strategically, Brander 
and Spencer (1983) show that firms tend to overinvest in R&D activities to gain higher market 
shares despite total costs not being minimized for the output produced. In another paper, they 
develop a model which describes the role of government intervention – e.g. R&D or export 
subsidies - for two PM firms competing in imperfectly competitive international markets. Their 
model shows that the government has an incentive to tax R&D to eliminate the domestic firm’s 
overuse of R&D (Spencer and Brander, 1983).  
Despite classical economics assuming that typical firms aim at maximizing profits, the 
literature also acknowledges that some firms, instead of exclusively pursuing profits, strive to 
maximize income per labor and/or employment opportunities, also known as labor-managed 
firms (LMFs).1 Historically, the dominant view has been that a LMF produces a smaller output 
than does a PMF (Ward, 1958; Domar, 1966 ; Vanek, 1970; Meade, 1972). However, recent 
studies show that LMFs could be as efficient and financially viable as PM firms, depending on 
management and market structures (Chen et al. 2016; Mikami 2018). In fact, LMFs present 
some advantages over the PMFs in some special contexts. For example, Monteiro and Stewart 
(2015) using data from Portugal show that high levels of market concentration and low entry 
costs are conducive to cooperatives which, on average, have more a productive labor force and 
higher probability of survival. There is also empirical evidence suggesting that cooperatives 
are to be preferred during economic downturns as membership in worker-owned firms provides 
more benefits than conventional employment (Monteleone & Reito 2017). 
1  There are differing ways to classify differences between PMFs (conventional firms) and LMFs (worker 
cooperatives). See Groot and van Der Linde (2017) for a more comprehensive review of these issues. The 
International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) defines cooperatives as being “people-centred enterprises owned, 
controlled and run by and for their members to realise their common economic, social, and cultural needs and 
aspirations” (https://www.ica.coop/en/cooperatives/what-is-a-cooperative). According to this definition, LMFs 
and cooperatives are quite similar. 
It is noted that LM firms exist not only in socialist economies but also in capitalist 
economies. Surprisingly, EURICSE and COOP (2020) report that China has only one LM firm 
in the list of top global 300 cooperatives in terms of their turn-over with the majority of these 
top cooperates located in capitalist economies such as USA (85 cooperatives), France (38), 
Germany (30), Japan and Netherland (18). In a capitalist economy, LM firms exist in various 
forms such as cooperatives and stock cooperative enterprises and operate in different sectors 
including agriculture, insurance and retail. Globally, it is estimated that at least 12% of the 
global working population are members of around 3 million cooperatives (EURICSE & COOP 
2020). Typically, in LM firms’ individual workers hold property rights in their enterprise’s 
assets through partnership deeds, individual capital accounts or hold a relatively high portion 
of shares.  
In terms of the coexistence of LM firms and PM firms in the market, Mai and Hwang 
(1989) pioneered the investigation of the influence of government export subsidization or 
taxation on an LMF and a PMF operating in an international duopoly market. They find that 
an export tax rather than a subsidy should be adopted by the government of the LMF to assist 
the firm to expand its market share in a third country. Extending Mai and Hwang (1989),  
Okuguchi (1991) finds the same result based on an assumption that both firms produce 
differentiated goods. Lambertini and Rossini (1998) assess the effect of strategic R&D 
investments of a LMF and a PMF in a Cournot duopoly model. They show that a LMF always 
over-invests while a PMF always under-invests. Luo (2013) shows how R&D spillovers 
differently influence R&D investments of a LMF and a PMF in a duopoly market and which 
depend on the firm’s absorptive capacity effect2.  
To our knowledge, there is a lack of literature which focuses on the role of government 
R&D subsidization in the context of competition between an LM and a PM firm in a mixed 
duopoly international market. A typical example observed recently is the intensive R&D 
subsidization programs for solar PV equipment manufacturing by differing countries in global 
competitive markets. Historically, China came late to PV production compared with other 
capitalist economies such as the US, Germany and Japan (Gang 2015). Those capitalist 
economies provided a range of subsidies, especially in R&D, to their domestic firms which 
mainly behave like PMFs. Similarly, Chinese governments at both central and local levels have 
subsidized R&D investment in state-owned and collective firms (Ball et al. 2017). Note that 
literature has reported that regardless differences in ownership, state-owned and collective 
2 Absorptive capacity refers to the degree to which a firm can benefit from other firms’ R&D activities when it 
also enhances its innovative ability.   
firms these behave like labor-managed firms (Xin & Frances 1998). Due to subsidies, the solar 
panel manufacturing capacity of China quadrupled between 2009 and 2011. These factual 
observations provide a best case for our theoretical investigation on how government 
subsidisation on R&D in a transition economy can help their LMFs to gain international 
competitive advantages over PMFs in capitalist countries. Specifically, we present a theory that 
explains the role of R&D rivalry between a LMF and a PMF in an imperfectly competitive 
market. In this setting, this paper also derives the optimal R&D subsidy or tax of each 
government under the assumption of maximizing domestic welfare being the government’s 
objective. 
Our model treats the governments and firms as players in a three-stage game. The 
government is assumed to be the first player which can commit itself to R&D subsidies before 
the firms make their R&D decisions. Following Brander and Spencer (1983), our model 
assumes that the firms have equal opportunity in setting their R&D levels. In the second stage 
of the game, the firms adopt R&D as a “commitment” or “credible threat” before output is 
produced. The cost-reducing R&D is viewed as a strategic investment that leads to greater 
market power in the international market due to lower marginal costs. This second stage R&D 
strategy is the result of a Nash equilibrium, which is made known to both firms. Following 
Dixit (1980), we assume the firms can correctly “see through” to the third-stage output levels 
as a result of a Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium is referred to as a “subgame perfect 
equilibrium” characterizing that the expectations of firms are confirmed in equilibrium.   
Our theoretical model produces several findings which deliver important policy 
implications for government policies. While the governments of LMFs can expect their 
strategic R&D subsidising activities to increase LMFs market share in international 
competition dominated by PMFs, the attainment of such a desirable outcome depends not only 
on the R&D elasticity of their LMFS but also on the R&D reaction curve of rival PMFs. This 
means that the governments of the LMFs need to consider their decisions in a more complex 
manner. Nevertheless, our results highlight the possibility of using governmental R&D 
subsidies to support the sustained growth of LMFs. That is, this can be viewed as a positive 
development given the decreasing trend of R&D subsidies being observed over the last few 
decades around the world. 
The main contribution of this paper to the literature in the area of LMF is extending the 
duopoly model of international trade between labor-managed and profit-maximizing firms by 
considering the impacts of R&D subsidy on the firms’ R&D investments, labor employments, 
exports to a third country, and the optimal R&D subsidy of each government. First, previous 
studies have either focused on the effects of a change in export subsidy on international duopoly 
between a LMF and a PMF (Mai & Hwang 1989; Ohnishi 2008) or the effects of a change in 
R&D subsidy between two PMFs (Spencer & Brander 1983). We fill the gap of the literature 
by considering the role of R&D subsidy in the imperfectly competitive world where a LMF and 
a PMF coexist. The investigation of the effects of R&D subsidy on firms’ behavior is important 
especially when direct export subsidy is restricted or violates trade rules. Second, our analysis 
focuses on LMF because LMF may allocate resources more efficiently than PMF (Groot & van 
Der Linde 2017) and there still exist some firms in Yugoslavia, America, England, France, 
Germany, China, and Italy, etc. (Luo 2013). Our analysis of LMF provides guidance to the 
government of LMF on how to make the best use of R&D subsidy to promote labor-managed 
firms to compete with traditional profit-maximizing firms in an international market. An 
understanding of government intervention is vital as a major difference between a LMF and a 
PMF is a higher demand reduces labor employment in the LMF and boosts employment in the 
PMF (Groot & van Der Linde 2017). Effective government intervention via R&D subsidy can 
prevent the disappearance of LMFs in a country. Lastly, the emphasis of our paper on R&D 
activities becomes more important nowadays as the world has been experiencing a substantial 
decline in research productivity during the last 40 years. Recent studies document empirical 
evidence that diminishing returns in idea production are a global phenomenon, including the 
global technology leader—the U.S. economy—as well as China and Germany (Bloom et al. 
2020; Boeing & Hünermund 2020). Therefore, our paper offers governments some insights 
into the development of designing appropriate R&D subsidy policies to tackle the problem.   
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model. Section 3 analyses the 
implications of government R&D subsidies for LMFs and measures the optimal R&D subsidy. 
Section 4 investigates the impact of the PMF’s government R&D subsidy and assess what is 
the optimal R&D policy. Section 5 discusses how the equilibrium will be affected by a change 
in the shape of the demand curve. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. The Basic model 
Consider a two-stage game played by two competing firms: a LMF and a PMF. Both firms 
compete in a duopoly market in a third country by exporting their products to this market. In 
the first stage, the firms choose R&D levels, and in the second stage, the labor inputs and output 
levels. We derive the equilibrium labor inputs and outputs by assuming R&D levels as given 
by the first stage. The second stage solution allows us to express the payoff function of each 
firm as a function the R&D levels chosen. 
We begin by writing the objectives of the LMF and the PMF as 
 𝑉𝑉�𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿�� =  𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿 =  1𝐿𝐿 [𝑅𝑅 �𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿), 𝑦𝑦��𝐿𝐿��� −  𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿);𝑋𝑋) − 𝑣𝑣𝑋𝑋] (1-1)  
  𝜋𝜋��𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿�� =  𝑅𝑅� �𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿),𝑦𝑦��𝐿𝐿��� −  ?̂?𝐶�𝑦𝑦��𝐿𝐿��;𝑋𝑋�� − 𝑣𝑣�𝑋𝑋� (1-2) 
  
 where symbols with a “^” (hat) denote the variables for the profit-maximization firm, and  𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦,  𝑦𝑦�)𝑦𝑦     total revenue function 𝑃𝑃(∙)                                    demand inverse function in the market 𝑦𝑦 = 𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿)                 production function 𝐶𝐶 = 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 − 𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)   variable cost (excluding R&D expenditure) 𝑈𝑈(∙)                                      cost reduction effect of R&D 𝑤𝑤     wage rate   𝐿𝐿     labor input  𝑦𝑦     product output  𝑣𝑣     R&D cost per unit  𝑥𝑥     R&D level 
The model assumes these two firms produce identical goods and use the same type of labor 
from their domestic labor markets. The output of the two firms hence are substitutes: the output 
of one good decreases the marginal revenue of the other. Thus: 𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦� < 0;  𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦� < 0;  𝑅𝑅�𝑦𝑦 < 0;  𝑅𝑅�𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦 < 0  (2) 
 
The variable cost 𝐶𝐶, reduces as a firm increases its R&D expenditure and the rate of decrease 
declines as R&D expenditure increases. Using subscripts to denote derivatives, this suggests 𝑈𝑈𝑥𝑥 > 0,𝑈𝑈�𝑥𝑥� > 0;  𝑈𝑈𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 < 0,𝑈𝑈�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥� < 0  (3-1) 
 𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥 < 0, ?̂?𝐶𝑥𝑥� < 0;  𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 > 0, ?̂?𝐶𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥� > 0;   (3-2) 
 
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 > 0,𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶� > 0; 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥 < 0,𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶� 𝑥𝑥� < 0 (3-3) 
 
Note that MC > 0 implies 𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦 <  𝜕𝜕(𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤)𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦 =  𝑤𝑤𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 =  𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕. An increase in R&D level reduces the 
marginal cost (𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥 < 0), implying 𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 > 0. The first-order conditions characterizing the 
Nash equilibrium in labor inputs are 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤 =  1𝑤𝑤 �𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤 − 𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤 � = 1𝑤𝑤 [�𝑃𝑃 + 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤 −  𝑤𝑤 + 𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤 −  𝜋𝜋(𝑤𝑤,𝑤𝑤� ;𝑥𝑥)𝑤𝑤 ] = 0 (4-1) 
  𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤� =  �𝑃𝑃 + 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦��𝑦𝑦�𝑤𝑤� −  𝑤𝑤� + 𝑈𝑈�𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦�𝑤𝑤� = 0 (4-2) 
  
These two equations are the labor reaction functions of LMF and PMF in implicit form, 
respectively, implying that a firm’s labor employment is determined by both of its own and 
rival’s R&D investments.3 
 The second-order conditions are 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 =  1𝑤𝑤 [𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤2�2𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦 +  𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 + 𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 � + 𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤�𝑃𝑃 + 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 + 𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦 �] < 0  (5-1) 
 
 𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤� = 𝑦𝑦�𝑤𝑤�2�2𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦� +  𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦� + 𝑈𝑈�𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦�  � + 𝑦𝑦�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤��𝑃𝑃 +  𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦� + 𝑈𝑈�𝑦𝑦�  � < 0 (5-2) 
 
We assume the following set of inequalities which is sufficient for the global stability of the 
equilibrium 𝐴𝐴 =  𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤� −  𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤�𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤 > 0  
 
(6-1) 
3 In our theoretical framework, whether the wage of LMF workers differs from the wage for PMF workers can be 
examined based on the labor reaction functions of the firms. According to the reaction functions, we can derive 
each firm’s wage rate as follows: 
LMF: 𝑤𝑤 = �𝑃𝑃 + 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤 + 𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤 − 𝜋𝜋(𝑤𝑤,𝑤𝑤� ;𝑥𝑥)𝑤𝑤          
PMF: 𝑤𝑤� = �𝑃𝑃 + 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦��𝑦𝑦�𝑤𝑤� + 𝑈𝑈�𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦�𝑤𝑤�  
 
 
Assuming that the LMF and the PMF produce an identical good and adopt the same technology, in equilibrium, 
the wage for the LMF workers will be lower than the wage for the PMF workers by the amount of the profit 
distributed to each worker in the LMF, thus, the bonus equal to 
𝜋𝜋(𝑤𝑤,𝑤𝑤� ;𝑥𝑥)𝑤𝑤  . However, taking into account the bonus, 
the total monetary payoff (i.e., wage plus bonus) each LMF’s worker receives is identical to the wage for the PMF.  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤� =  1𝑤𝑤 �𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤� −  𝜋𝜋𝜕𝜕�𝑤𝑤 � < 0; 𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤 =   (𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦 + 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦�)𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤𝑦𝑦�𝑤𝑤� < 0  
 
(6-2) 
For a given set of 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑥𝑥�, the slopes of the reaction functions of labor inputs of the firms, 
respectively - derived from the total derivatives of (4-1) and (4-2) with respect to 𝐿𝐿 and 𝐿𝐿� - are  










𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿�𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 −  𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿�𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿) < 0 (7-3)  
 
These equations indicate that both firms’ reaction curves for labor inputs are downward 
sloping: however, the labor reaction curve of the LMF has a steeper slope than that of the PMF 
(See Appendix B). Combining the firms’ production functions with the labor reaction curves, 
we can derive the output reaction curves for both firms. Similarly, the output reaction curve of 
the LMF is steeper than that of the PMF. 
Under the theoretical model specified above, we are now ready to examine the effects of 
an increase in a firm’s R&D expenditure on both firms’ labor inputs and outputs.  
2.1 The impact of LMF’s R&D expenditure on labor inputs and outputs 
We first consider the impact of an increase in the R&D expenditure of the LMF on labor 
inputs and outputs for both firms. Assuming the R&D expenditure of the PMF is fixed, taking 
the total derivatives of Eqs. (4-1) and (4-2) with respect to 𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿� , and 𝑥𝑥 gives  










Holding the R&D expenditure of the PMF constant, Cramer’s rule shows that the impacts of 
the LMF’s R&D expenditure on the labor inputs of both firms are4 
4 See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion.  
 𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥 ≡  𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 = −  𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝜋𝜋�𝜕𝜕�𝜕𝜕�𝐴𝐴 > 0; 𝐿𝐿�𝑥𝑥 ≡  𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤�𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 =  𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿𝜋𝜋�𝜕𝜕�𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴 < 0   (9) 
 
 
where 𝐴𝐴 =  𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤� − 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤�𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤.Eq. (9) suggests that an increase in the R&D expenditure of the 
LMF has a positive effect on its labor inputs while reduces its competitor’s labor inputs. 
Consequently, the LMF gains a larger market share in the international market by hiring more 
labor to increase its output while the PMF loses its market share due to a decline in the output 
production.  
 2.2 The impact of PMF’s R&D expenditure on inputs and outputs 
To analyse the impact of changes in the R&D expenditure of the PMF on the labor inputs 
and outputs of both firms, we assume that the R&D expenditure of the LMF is fixed. Taking 
the total derivatives of Eqs. (4-1) and (4-2) with respect to 𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿� , and 𝑥𝑥� leads to 
 𝐿𝐿�𝑥𝑥� ≡  𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤�𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥� = −  𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋�𝜕𝜕�𝐿𝐿�𝐴𝐴 > 0; 𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥� ≡  𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥� =  𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝜋𝜋�𝜕𝜕�𝐿𝐿�𝐴𝐴 < 0   (10)  
 
Eq. (10) shows that when the PMF increases its R&D expenditure, its labor inputs and outputs 
both, increase. However, it causes reductions in its rival’s labor inputs and outputs. The results 
clearly indicate that, in a duopoly market, an increase in R&D expenditure helps a firm to 
increase its own labor employment and market share while it has an adverse impact on its 
competitor’s labor employment and market share. 
2.3 The determination of R&D expenditures  
Our analysis so far has focused on the second-stage Nash equilibrium in labor inputs and 
outputs under the assumption that the firms’ R&D levels are resolved in the first-stage Nash 
game and made known to each other. We now turn our analysis to how firms determine their 
own R&D levels. 
Eqs. (9) and (10) show that the labor inputs of both firms are influenced by the R&D levels 
of the firms. Hence, the profit functions described in Eqs. (1-1) and (1-2) can be expressed in 
the following forms 𝑔𝑔 ≡ 𝑉𝑉�𝐿𝐿(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�), 𝐿𝐿�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�); 𝑥𝑥� (11-1) 
 𝑔𝑔� ≡ 𝜋𝜋��𝐿𝐿(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�), 𝐿𝐿�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�); 𝑥𝑥�� (11-2) 
 
 
The first-stage Nash equilibrium in R&D expenditure of the LMF must satisfy 
  𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 = 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥 + 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿�𝑥𝑥 − 𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 − 𝑣𝑣𝐿𝐿 
 
Accordingly, Eq. (4-1), this can be expressed as   
  
 














The left-hand side of Eqs. (12-1) and (12-2), respectively, is the marginal profit of a firm’s 
R&D expenditure while the right-hand side shows its marginal cost. The results suggest that, 
if a firm uses R&D strategically5, the optimal R&D expenditure can be determined only when 
it makes marginal profit equal to marginal cost. The second-order conditions are 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 < 0 and 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥� < 0. We also assume that the own effect of R&D on marginal profit exceeds the cross 




3. Analysis of LMF’s government R&D subsidy policy  
The previous section does not incorporate the role of government into the model. This 
section explores the effect of the government R&D subsidy of LMFs on a firms’ R&D 
expenditure, labor inputs, and outputs. We also examine the government’s optimal R&D 
subsidy policy. Our analysis assumes that the government’s R&D subsidy directly influences  
the R&D expenditures of the firms while its impact on labor inputs and outputs are indirectly 
affected through the R&D-labor inputs and labor inputs-outputs channels.  
3.1 Impact of government R&D subsidies on LMFs 
5 We also consider a scenario in which firms adopt R&D for cost reduction. Our result shows that firms invest 
more in R&D activities when they use it strategically compared to when R&D plays no strategic role. Proofs are 
available upon request.  
When only the LMF receives an R&D subsidy from its government, the firms’ profit 
functions become 
𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�; 𝑠𝑠) = 1𝐿𝐿 [𝑅𝑅 �𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿), 𝑦𝑦��𝐿𝐿��� − 𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿); 𝑥𝑥) − (𝑣𝑣 − 𝑠𝑠)𝑥𝑥]    𝑔𝑔�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�) = 𝑅𝑅� �𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿),𝑦𝑦��𝐿𝐿��� − ?̂?𝐶�𝑦𝑦��𝐿𝐿��; 𝑥𝑥�� − 𝑣𝑣�𝑥𝑥� (13) 
 
where 𝐿𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�), 𝐿𝐿� = 𝐿𝐿�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�), and 𝑠𝑠 denotes the government subsidy for each unit of the 
R&D investment of the LMF.   The first-order condition for the maximization of Eq. (13) is  𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�; 𝑠𝑠) = 𝑤𝑤𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿−𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿 𝑤𝑤2 = 1𝑤𝑤 �𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥 − 𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤 𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥� = 0  𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�) = 0 (14) 
 
where 𝜋𝜋 = 𝑅𝑅 �𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿), 𝑦𝑦��𝐿𝐿��� − 𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿); 𝑥𝑥) − (𝑣𝑣 − 𝑠𝑠)𝑥𝑥 . The total differentiation of Eq. (14) 
yields   𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥� + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 = 0 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 + 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�  = 0 
where 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 = 1𝑤𝑤 �1 − 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤 𝑥𝑥� = 1𝑤𝑤 (1 − 𝜂𝜂). 𝜂𝜂 measures the sensitivity of labor input to changes of 
R&D level (i.e., the R&D elasticity) for the LMF. The sign of 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 relies on the value of 𝜂𝜂 relative to 1. Expressing the total differential above in matrix form and applying Cramer’s 
rule show 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ≡ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 = −𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥�𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥� − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥�𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 = −𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥�𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷  
                      𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 ≡ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 = 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥� − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥�𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 = 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷  
 
(15) 
As discussed in the previous section, since 𝐷𝐷 > 0  and 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥� < 0 , the impact of the 
government’s R&D subsidy on the R&D investment of the LMF depends on whether the sign 
of 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥(= 1𝑤𝑤 (1 − 𝜂𝜂)). This suggests that the LMF would increase its R&D expenditure if the 
sensitivity of labor employment to changes of R&D level is less than 1 (i.e., 𝜂𝜂 < 1) while its 
investment in R&D reduces when the R&D elasticity is greater than 1.  
In contrast, the impact of the LMF’s government R&D subsidy on its rival’s R&D 
investment is more complicated because it involves the relationship of the slopes of the reaction 
curves of both firms. The slopes of the reaction curves of the firms can be derived from the 
total differential of Eq. (14). Rearranging the results, we obtain their slopes as 
𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿: 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = −𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� 
                          𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿: 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = −𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥� 
 
(16) 
The second-order conditions state that both 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 and 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥�  are negative. Consequently, the 
relationship between the slopes of these two firms can be established based on the signs of 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� 
and 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥. One thing that is worth noting is that the LMF’s R&D reaction curve moves to the 
right as the LMF’s government R&D subsidy increases if 𝜂𝜂 < 1 (i.e., 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 > 0) while it moves 
to the left if 𝜂𝜂 > 1 (i.e., 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 < 0) (See Appendix C). The following shows the cases according 
to the various relationships between the R&D reaction curves of both firms.   
Case I:  LMF: 
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� > 0 and PMF: 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿� < 0 if  𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� > 0 and 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 < 0. 
For 𝜂𝜂 < 1, the signs of 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 and 𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 in Eq. (15) are  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ≡ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 = −𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥�𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷 > 0 
                      𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 ≡ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 = 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷 < 0 
  
 
The result that the LMF’s R&D investment increases while its rival’s R&D investment 
decreases as the government of the LMF increases its R&D subsidy can be depicted in Figure 
1. When η<1, Figure 1 shows that an increase in the government R&D subsidy of the LMF 
shifts LMF’s R&D reaction curve to the right. Consequently, it increases the R&D investment 
of the LMF but decreases its rival’s R&D investment. 
  
 




                                                  0                                           𝑥𝑥    
  Figure 1: Shifts in LMF reaction curve due to LMF’s government R&D subsidy  
Case II:  LMF: 
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� < 0 and PMF: 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿� < 06 if  𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� < 0 and 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 < 0. 
For 𝜂𝜂 < 1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ≡ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = −𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿�𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷 > 0 and 𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 ≡ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = 𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷 < 0  
 
The graph of the reaction curves for both firms also confirms the results that the LMF’s 
R&D investment increases but the R&D investment of its rival decreases as the government 
R&D subsidy of the LMF increases.7 
Case III:  LMF: 
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� > 0 and PMF: 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿� > 0 if  𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� > 0 and 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 > 0. 
For 𝜂𝜂 < 1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ≡ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = −𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿�𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷 > 0 and 𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 ≡ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = 𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷 > 0 
 
 
In this case, both R&D reaction curves have positive slopes but the reaction curve of the 
LMF is steeper. When the government of the LMF increases its R&D subsidy, it causes both 
firms to increase their R&D investments.  
Case IV:  LMF: 
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� < 0 and PMF: 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿� > 0 if  𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� < 0 and 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 > 0. 
For 𝜂𝜂 < 1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ≡ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = −𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿�𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷 > 0 and 𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 ≡ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = 𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷 > 0  
The corresponding R&D reaction curve of the LMF is negative while the R&D reaction 
curve of the PMF is positive. As in case III, an increase in the LMF’s government R&D subsidy 
creates a positive impact on the R&D investments of both firms.  
6 Similar to the labor reaction curves, the R&D reaction curve of the LMF is steeper than that of the PMF.  
7 To save space, we do not depict the figure here.    
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Overall, the analysis above shows that when 𝜂𝜂 < 1 (𝜂𝜂 > 1), an increase in the government 
R&D subsidy of the LMF always leads to increases (decreases) in the R&D expenses for the 
LMF. However, its impact on the R&D expenses of the PMF is conditional on the slope of 
PMF’s R&D reaction curve. Combining Eqs. (15) and (16) shows that there exists a special 
relation between 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 and 𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 as 




Eq. (17) provides a detailed explanation about how increases in the government R&D subsidy 
for the LMF influence the R&D investment of the PMF. Specifically, the magnitude of the 
impact is determined by two components. The first component is the degree to which the 
LMF’s R&D investment responds to its government’s R&D subsidy policy (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥). A stronger 
response leads to a greater impact on the R&D investment of the PMF. The second component 
is the sign of the slope of the R&D reaction curve of the PMF. An upward-sloping (or 
downward-sloping) reaction curve implies that the PMF would increase (decrease) its R&D 
investment.   
3.2 Optimal LMF’s government R&D subsidy   
Our analysis shows that the LMF’s government R&D subsidy has various impacts on the 
R&D investment decisions of both firms. The next question that is natural to ask is “What is 
the optimal level of government R&D subsidization of the LMF?”  
To answer this question, we assume that the objective of the government is to maximize 
the social welfare of its own country when determining the optimal government R&D policy. 
We define the social welfare measure as the firm’s profit in excess of the total R&D subsidy:   
  𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠) =  𝜋𝜋(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�; 𝑠𝑠) −  𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥  (18) 
 
where  𝜋𝜋 = 𝑅𝑅(𝑦𝑦,𝑦𝑦�) − 𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦; 𝑥𝑥) − (𝑣𝑣 − 𝑠𝑠)𝑥𝑥.  Differentiating Eq. (18) with respect to s shows 𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 = (𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥 − 𝑠𝑠)𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 
According to Eqs. (14) and (17), the first-order condition can be expressed as  𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 = �𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 + (𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 − 1)𝑠𝑠 + 𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥� 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿� 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 = 0 
Hence, the optimal LMF’s government R&D subsidy is  
𝑠𝑠 =  11−𝜂𝜂 (𝑊𝑊𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤 + 𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥� 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿)  (19) 
where 𝜂𝜂 = 𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤 𝑥𝑥 > 0 and 𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥� < 0 (See Appendix D).  
According to Eq. (19), we present the optimal R&D subsidy or tax policy of LMF’s government 
in Table 1.  
Table 1: Optimal R&D Policy of LMF Government 
LMF’s R&D Elasticity Tax Subsidy 𝜂𝜂 < 1 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 ≤ −𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥�  −𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥� ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 𝜂𝜂 > 1 −𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥� ≤ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 ≤ −𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥�  
   
To maximize its social welfare, Table 1 shows that the government of the LMF can either 
tax or subsidize the firm’s R&D investment, depending on whether the response of the firm’s 
R&D investment to the government’s subsidy is elastic or inelastic8, and the slope of the PMF’s 
R&D reaction curve. Interestingly, our results regarding the government’s optimal R&D 
subsidy policy is different from that of Brander and Spencer (1983) who suggest that it is 
desirable for the government to subsidize its own firm when both firms are PMFs competing 
in a duopoly international market. In contrast, in the context of a LMF and a PMF competing 
in an international market, our model show that it is only socially optimal for the LMF’s 
government to subsidize their firm’s R&D expenditure in the case that the PMF is highly 
responsive to the level of R&D of the LMF and its government’s subsidy. Therefore, the slope 
of the PMF’s R&D reaction curve is greater than the turning point (i.e. −𝑊𝑊𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿� ) in the case of 𝜂𝜂 < 1. If the slope of PMF’s R&D reaction curve is smaller than the turning point, the subsidy 
policy is not justified from the viewpoint of maximising social welfare. If 𝜂𝜂 > 1, a subsidy 
policy is recommended as long as the slope of PMF’s R&D reaction curve is smaller than the 
turning point. 
On the other hand, taxing LMF’s R&D activities may be considered if the PMF’s reaction 
is not responsive and LMF’s employment and market share are highly and positively 
responsive to its R&D activities. This sounds reasonable as there is no reason why an LMF’s 
government should promote further R&D given its firms are performing well on their own. 
This is particularly clear in the case of  𝜂𝜂 < 1. However, when 𝜂𝜂 > 1, the decision to tax its 
8 When 𝜂𝜂=1, LMF’s government R&D subsidy policy has no impact on the R&D investments of both firms 
because 
   𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 = 0.  
firm for the LMF’s government gets more complicated given uncertainty over the net 
responsiveness of PMFs’ with respect to both taxation policy and changes in the R&D level of 
the LMF. 
4. Analysis of PMFs’ government R&D subsidy policy   
In this section, we turn our analysis to the implications of government R&D subsidies for 
the PMF.  
4.1 Impact of government R&D subsidies for PMFs 
When the PMF’s government subsidizes the R&D activities of its firm, the profit functions 
of both firms become 
𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�) = 1𝐿𝐿 [𝑅𝑅 �𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿), 𝑦𝑦��𝐿𝐿��� − 𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿); 𝑥𝑥) − 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥]    𝑔𝑔�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�; ?̂?𝑠) = 𝑅𝑅� �𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿),𝑦𝑦��𝐿𝐿��� − ?̂?𝐶�𝑦𝑦��𝐿𝐿��; 𝑥𝑥�� − (𝑣𝑣� − ?̂?𝑠)𝑥𝑥� (20) 
where ?̂?𝑠 denotes the PMF’s government R&D subsidy. Following the analysis described in 
Section 3.1 for the LMF, we obtain the impact of such a subsidy on both firms as 
𝑥𝑥?̂?𝑥 = 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥�𝐷𝐷  
                      𝑥𝑥�?̂?𝑥 = −𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷  (21) 
 
From the second-order condition (𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 < 0) and 𝐷𝐷 > 0, Eq. (21) suggests that an increase in 
the PMF’s government R&D subsidy has a positive impact on the PMF’s R&D investment 
(𝑥𝑥�?̂?𝑥 > 0).  However, its impact on the R&D investment of its competitor is determined by 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥�  . 
Since the slopes of the R&D reaction curves of these firms are also associated with 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� and 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 , we examine the impacts of the PMF’s R&D subsidy on both firms based on the 
relationship of 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� and 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 below.  
Case I:  LMF: 
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� > 0 and PMF: 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿� < 0 if  𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� > 0 and 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 < 0. 
In this case, the R&D reaction curve of the LMF is upward-sloping while the slope for the 
PMF is downward-sloping. An increase in the R&D subsidy for the PMF shifts its reaction 
curve to the right (See Appendix E). The mathematical expressions below are consistent with 
the graphical results.9 
𝑥𝑥?̂?𝑥 = 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥�𝐷𝐷 > 0 
                             𝑥𝑥�?̂?𝑥 = −𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷 > 0 
 
  
Case II:  LMF: 
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� < 0 and PMF: 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿� < 0 if  𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� < 0 and 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 < 0. 
The R&D reaction curves of both firms are downward sloping the steeper one being for 
the LMF. When the PMF’s government increases its R&D subsidy for the PMF, it encourages 
the firm to invest more in its R&D activities but discourages its rival’s R&D investment. Thus, 𝑥𝑥?̂?𝑥 < 0 and 𝑥𝑥�?̂?𝑥 > 0.  
Case III:  LMF: 
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� > 0 and PMF: 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿� > 0 if  𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� > 0 and 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 > 0. 
The slopes of the R&D reaction curves of the firms are both positive, and the LMF has a 
steeper curve than does the PMF. In this case, both firms would increase their R&D investments 
in response to an increase in the R&D subsidy for PMF. Thus, both 𝑥𝑥?̂?𝑥 and 𝑥𝑥�?̂?𝑥 are positive.  
Case IV:  LMF: 
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� < 0 and PMF: 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = − 𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔�𝐿𝐿�𝐿𝐿� > 0 if  𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� < 0 and 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 > 0. 
As in Case III, the R&D reaction curve of the PMF is upward sloping. An increase in the 
government R&D subsidy for the PMF causes the firm’s reaction curve to shift to the left. 
Together with a downward-sloping reaction curve of the LMF, the left shift of the PMF’s 
reaction curve due to the R&D subsidy leads to a result identical to the one in Case II (i.e., 𝑥𝑥?̂?𝑥 < 0 and 𝑥𝑥�?̂?𝑥 > 0).  
Our analysis of the government R&D subsidy for the PMF shows that the subsidy always 
increases the R&D investment of the PMF. In contrast, the impact on its rival’s R&D 
expenditure is conditional on the slope of LMF’s R&D reaction curve – a higher (lower) level 
of R&D investment for the LMF for an upward-sloping (a downward-sloping) reaction curve. 
4.2 Optimal PMFs’ government R&D subsidy   
9 We do not present the figure to save space; however, the graphical analysis is similar to Figure 1 except for the 
shift is for  PMF’s reaction curve in this case.  
To determine the optimal R&D subsidy policy for its firm, we again assume that the PMF’s 
government pursues to maximize its social welfare measure. This can be represented as 𝑊𝑊� (?̂?𝑠) =  𝑔𝑔�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�; ?̂?𝑠) −  ?̂?𝑠𝑥𝑥� = 𝜋𝜋�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�; ?̂?𝑠) −  ?̂?𝑠𝑥𝑥� (22) 
The differentiation of Eq. (22) with respect to ?̂?𝑠 yields  𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊�𝑑𝑑?̂?𝑠 = 𝜋𝜋�𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥?̂?𝑥 − ?̂?𝑠𝑥𝑥�?̂?𝑥 
According to Eq. (21), 𝑥𝑥?̂?𝑥 = 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝐷𝐷 = − 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷 �− 𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑔𝑔𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿� = 𝑥𝑥�?̂?𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿, the first-order condition can be 
expressed as 𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊�𝑑𝑑?̂?𝑠 = (𝜋𝜋�𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 − ?̂?𝑠)𝑥𝑥�?̂?𝑥 = 0 
Hence, the optimal PMF’s government R&D subsidy is  
?̂?𝑠 =  𝜋𝜋�𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 (23) 
Since 𝜋𝜋�𝑥𝑥 is negative (See Appendix F), the sign of the R&D reaction curve of the LMF plays 
a critical role in determining whether ?̂?𝑠 is positive or negative. Specifically, the government of 
the PMF should subsidize its firm’s investment in R&D activities if the R&D reaction curve of 
LMF is downward-sloping while it should tax its firm’s R&D investment when the reaction 
curve of the LMF is upward-sloping.  
Unlike the determination of the optimal R&D subsidy policy for the government of the 
LMF, which needs to consider both its rival’s R&D reaction curve and the elasticity of the 
LMF’s R&D response to the subsidy, the PMF’s government needs to consider the slope of the 
reaction curve of its rival only to determine whether to subsidize or tax its firm. LMFs tend to 
over-invest in R&D so governments of LMFs tax them to maximize the social welfare.  
5. The role of the shape of the demand function  
The shape of the demand curve, whether the curve is convex, concave, or linear, often 
plays a vital role in the analysis of Cournot competition.10 In this section, we discuss the role 
it plays in our model. We start with our discussion about its impact on the LMF by showing 
that the shape of the demand curve will affect the slope of the firm’s labor reaction curve. 
Combining Eqs. (5-1) and (7-1), the slope of LMF’s labor reaction curve can be expressed as: 
10 We thank the reviewer for raising this issue.  
𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 = −  𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� = −  𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕2�2𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕+ 𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦+𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 �+ 𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕�𝑀𝑀+ 𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦+𝑈𝑈𝜕𝜕 �𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕� < 0                            (24)   
Note that the slope is negative because both 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 and 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤�  are negative. When the demand curve 
is convex (concave/linear), the second-order derivative of the price inverse function with 
respect to the product output, 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦, is positive (negative/zero). A positive (negative) 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 makes 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 less (more) negative. Therefore, the labor reaction curve derived based on a convex demand 
curve is flatter than the one derived based on a linear demand curve. The labor reaction curve 
is steeper when the demand curve is concave.  
We now consider the impact of the shape of the demand curve on the PMF. Combining 
Eqs. (5-2) and (7-2), the slope of the firm’s labor reaction curve can be expressed as: 
𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤�𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 = −  𝜋𝜋�𝜕𝜕�𝜕𝜕 𝜋𝜋�𝜕𝜕�𝜕𝜕� = 𝜋𝜋�𝜕𝜕�𝜕𝜕 𝑦𝑦�𝜕𝜕�2�2𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕�+ 𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕�𝜕𝜕�𝑦𝑦�+𝑈𝑈�𝜕𝜕�𝜕𝜕�  �+ 𝑦𝑦�𝜕𝜕�𝜕𝜕��𝑀𝑀+ 𝑀𝑀𝜕𝜕�𝑦𝑦�+𝑈𝑈�𝜕𝜕�  � < 0     (25) 
The slope is negative because both 𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤 and 𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤�  are negative. Eq. (25) shows that the shape of 
the demand curve, 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦� , can affect the slope of the firm’s labor reaction curve. Compared to the 
labor reaction curve derived when the demand function is linear (𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦� = 0), the corresponding 
labor reaction curve is steeper when the demand function is convex (𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦� > 0 ) and flatter when 
the demand function is concave �𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦� < 0�.    
Our analysis so far has shown that the shape of the demand function can change the slopes 
of the labor reaction curves of the firms. Will the shape of the demand curve affect the labor 
employments of the firms in equilibrium? The answer is no because the equilibrium labor 
employments are determined by the firms’ reaction functions as formulated in Eqs (4-1) and 
(4-2). A closer look at the two equations reveals that neither 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 nor 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦�  plays any role in the 
solution to the equation system, suggesting the shape of the demand curve has no impact on 
the firms’ labor employments and, hence, market shares in equilibrium.  
Similarly, we can investigate the influence of the shape of the demand curve on the 
findings discussed in the remaining sections of our paper. For example, to explore whether the 
shape of the demand curve may change the impacts of the LMF’s R&D expenditure on the 
labor employments of both firms, we can examine the role of  𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 and/or 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦�  in Eq. (9). It is 
not difficult to see that changing the shape of the demand curve does not change the direction 
of the impacts of the LMF’s R&D expenditure on the labor inputs of both firms. The 
magnitudes of the impacts on labor employments may slightly differ for different shapes of the 
demand curve, the results will be qualitatively the same regardless of the shape of the demand 
curve assumed in the model.   
6. Conclusions 
Using a simple three-stage Nash duopoly model, this paper examines the effect of R&D 
rivalry between a labor managed firm and a profit maximising firm in an international market 
and the optimal level of government R&D subsidization. Our model yields three important 
results.  
Firstly, when a firm adopts R&D as a strategic investment, the strategic R&D expenditure 
is higher than the R&D expenditure that minimizes total costs. When a firm increases such 
R&D investment, it increases its own market share in an international market due to the positive 
impact of R&D on labor inputs; however, such a strategy reduces its rival’s labor employment 
as well as market share.  
Secondly, we find that the influence of the LMF’s government R&D subsidy on R&D 
expenditure, labor input, and output of the LMF depends on the firm’s R&D elasticity. The 
R&D subsidy impact on its rival’s R&D investment also relies on the slope of its rival’s R&D 
reaction curve. The R&D elasticity of the LMF and the slope of the R&D reaction curve of the 
PMF both play a critical role in determining whether the government of the LMF should 
subsidize or tax its firm’s R&D investment.  
Thirdly, for the PMF, there is a positive relationship between the R&D subsidy received 
from its government and its R&D expenditure, labor input, and output. In contrast, whether 
such an R&D subsidy increases the relevant variables of its rival depends on the slope of the 
R&D reaction curve of the PMF. Compared to its counterpart, there is a less sophisticated 
procedure for the government of PMFs government in determining its optimal R&D 
subsidy/tax policy. The only factor that affects the PMF’s government policy is the slope of its 
competitor’s R&D reaction curve. 
We should emphasize that our analysis in the present paper does not imply in any sense a 
recommendation that R&D subsidisation policies be implemented. As stated in Spencer and 
Brander (1983), any policy advocating subsidies should be viewed with suspicion due to the 
uncertainty in the possibility that welfare gains are greater than opportunity costs of subsidies. 
In addition, governmental subsidies are also likely to trigger tensions between governments as 
observed in the case of solar PV manufacturing reported in Ball et al. (2017). It is also noted 
that trade tensions often harm firms and consumers not only in countries directly involved in 
the rivalry but also in other countries. However, where there are opportunities that do not 
impose any crowding out effects, then R&D subsidies could well be beneficial. For example, 
start-up technologies with clear potential benefits to society which would otherwise have 
struggled to establish. A pertinent example is that of the widely recognised dynamic ride 
sharing systems (DRS) which has the potential to bring about fundamental changes to vehicular 
transport which in particular could provide more cost-effective and convenient individualised 
forms of transport (Gecchelin and Webb, 2019). Such subsidies in the past have also helped 
certain industries to catch-up, for example, in the case of China entering PV production (Gang, 
2015). As Groot and van der Linde (2017) point out such subsidies need not be permanent, but 
prevail only to provide start-up support and to help gain a strong footing. 
  
Appendix A 
Eq. (9) shows A, 𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤� , 𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤, and 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥 all jointly determine the direction of the impact of the LMF 
R&D expenditures on the labor inputs for firms.  We show that the sign of 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥 is positive.  
According to Eq. (4-1), 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤 can also be expressed as 
𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤 =  1𝐿𝐿 [�𝑃𝑃 + 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤 −  𝑤𝑤 + 𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤 −  1𝐿𝐿 (𝑅𝑅 − 𝐶𝐶 − 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥)]  
Hence, 
𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥 ≡ 𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 = 1𝐿𝐿 (𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤 + 1𝐿𝐿 (𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥 + 𝑣𝑣)] 𝑈𝑈𝑦𝑦𝑥𝑥 > 0 (as discussed earlier), if (𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥 + 𝑣𝑣) > 0 then 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑥𝑥 > 0.  
 
Appendix B 
Eq. (7-3) implies that the LMF’s labor reaction curve is steeper than the PMF’s labor reaction 
curve. Below is our proof of Eq. (7-3): 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿�𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 −  𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿�𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 
=  −  𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤� − �−  𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤 𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤� � 
=  −  (𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤� − 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤�𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤)𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤�𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤�  
The sign of the result can be determined based on Eqs (6-1), (6-2), and (5-2). In particular, Eq. 
(6-1) shows that (𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤� − 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤�𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤) is positive; Eq. (6-2) shows that 𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤�  is negative; and Eq. 
(5-2) shows that 𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤�𝑤𝑤�  is negative. Therefore, the overall result is negative. Since both reaction 
curves are down-ward sloping, this suggests that the reaction curve of LMF is steeper than that 
of PMF.  
 
Appendix C 
Regardless of the signs of the slops of the R&D reaction curves of the firms, the stability 
condition 𝐷𝐷 > 0 implies a greater absolute value of the slope of LMF’s R&D reaction curve 
than that of PMF’s R&D reaction curve. This suggests that LMF’s R&D reaction curve is 
steeper than PMF’s R&D reaction curve.  
Taking the total differential of 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�; 𝑠𝑠) in Eq. (14) with respect to 𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥� and 𝑠𝑠, because 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 <
0, we show that when 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 = −𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 − 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 > 0 it suggests that LMF’s R&D reaction curve 
always moves to the right regardless of whether 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� is positive or negative.  
When 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� < 0 (𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥� > 0) , this implies LMF’s R&D reaction curve is downward-sloping 
(upward-sloping). Given that  𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 > 0 , it means 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 > 0  and 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 > 0 (𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 < 0) . Graphically, 
these results imply that an increase in LMF’s government R&D subsidy shifts LMF’s R&D 
reaction curve to the right.  
  
Appendix D 
Differentiating  𝜋𝜋  with respect to 𝑥𝑥�  shows  𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥� = �𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦 − 𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥� + 𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦�𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿�𝑥𝑥� 
       = �𝜋𝜋𝜕𝜕𝑦𝑦𝜕𝜕� 𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥� + 𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦�𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿�𝑥𝑥� 
Eq. (4-1) suggests 𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤 = 𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤 , hence 
    𝜋𝜋𝑥𝑥� = �𝜋𝜋𝑤𝑤� 𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥� + 𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦�𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿�𝑥𝑥� < 0.  
 
Appendix E 
The first-order condition of the profit function of PMF is 𝑔𝑔�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�; ?̂?𝑠) = 𝜋𝜋�𝑥𝑥� = 0. Taking the total 
differential of it and rearrange the terms shows 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�?̂?𝑥 = −𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥?̂?𝑥 − 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥�?̂?𝑥 > 0 
When 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 < 0, this implies PMF’s R&D reaction curve is downward-sloping. The above 
condition holds (i.e., 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�?̂?𝑥 > 0) only if both 𝑥𝑥?̂?𝑥 and 𝑥𝑥�?̂?𝑥 are positive, which suggests that PMF’s 
reaction curve moves to the right as its government increases R&D subsidy.  
If 𝑔𝑔�𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 > 0 , an upward-sloping R&D reaction curve for PMF shifts to the left when its 




Eq. (20) shows the profit function of PMF as 𝑔𝑔�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥�; ?̂?𝑠) = 𝜋𝜋� = 𝑅𝑅� �𝑦𝑦(𝐿𝐿),𝑦𝑦��𝐿𝐿��� − ?̂?𝐶�𝑦𝑦��𝐿𝐿��; 𝑥𝑥�� − (𝑣𝑣� − ?̂?𝑠)𝑥𝑥� 
𝜋𝜋�𝑥𝑥 = 𝑅𝑅�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥 + (𝑅𝑅�𝑦𝑦� − ?̂?𝐶𝑦𝑦�)𝑦𝑦�𝑤𝑤�𝐿𝐿�𝑥𝑥 
According to Eq. (4-2), it can be derived that  𝜋𝜋�𝑤𝑤� = �𝑅𝑅�𝑦𝑦� − ?̂?𝐶𝑦𝑦��𝑦𝑦�𝑤𝑤� = 0.  
Hence, 𝜋𝜋�𝑥𝑥 = 𝑅𝑅�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑥𝑥 < 0.  
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